In the near future, I plan to make some posts about morality and ethics. This post will simultaneously serve as a FAQ page and declaration of affiliation. Here, I will write briefly what I think about the major branches of Philosophical ethics, and show where my personal affiliations lie.
This introduction should help you – the reader – in being a good starting point for the coming posts. At the same tine, it will help me, in that – when I cam critiquing, lets say, utilitarianism – I won’t need to state in great detail that I am a virtue ethicist and that this clouds my judgment of the theory being discussed.
Consequentialist theories look at the consequences of actions. Typically, the analysis of consequences is used pick a course of action which maximizes the presence of a certain value or set of values at the end. Utilitarianism for example aims to maximize utility, hedonism maximises for pleasure, Marxism for cultivation, etcetera.
Consequentialists – in my option – fall into two camps: the practical and the useless. The practical have actual means of calculating the relevant values in a given set of circumstances. While these calculations usually leave something to be desired -- thereby opening up the theory to more repugnant conclusions than most – they are generally useful in their ability to asses the world and potential courses of action. The useless (or theoretical) consequentialist states that we can assess morality by looking at the relative presence certain specific values in consequences, but does not outline how to measure these values. They are, in this way, much like a virtue ethicist who does not explain what virtues are, or which virtues we should embody.
While consequentialists (of the practical type) are great at analysing situations, assessing moral progress, and identifying potentially high-impact courses of action, they are not NECESSARILY great at bringing about these states. A consequentialist world would undoubtedly be quite nice to live in, though it is not necessary that the people in that world are moral, nor that the society as a whole is exactly because the means and reason of the action do not matter, only the consequence.
Deontological theories are theories of duty where the moral course of action is the one which is in accordance with a person’s (or group’s) obligations. There is much debate on whether these duties are circumstantial or categorical. If a duty such as “do not lie’’ is categorical, then it is immoral to lie, even if it would save someone’s life. If the duty is circumstantial, then we may lie in certain – well defined -- circumstances (such as when lying would save a life).
Deontologists thus only look at actions when assessing the morality of behaviour, not at the consequences. However, the duties themselves do supposedly bring forth good consequences, perhaps even maximally good ones.
While deontologists can easily assess why a certain course of action was wrong – even if that action lead to a favourable outcome – they can not say anything against a person who followed their duty but achieved nothing. Certainly, there might be a duty to “try at least *this* hard’’, but trying and accomplishing are only loosely related. Furthermore, while a deontological world would be full of moral actions, it would – in my option – not be full of moral agents, because the agents acts in total disregard of the consequences of their actions.
Theories of virtue asses the character of people, groups, or systems. They generally define a set of traits which are good people (groups, or systems) embody. Importantly, good people do not just poses these traits, as they also act them out, and do so entirely without effort, as if it is the most natural thing to do. Classic examples of virtues are: Courage, wisdom, moderation, justice, etcetera.
There are many reasons as to why I am personally a virtue ethicist, rather too many to concisely put in this post, but let me cover some of the ways in which virtue ethics meets the challenges of consequentialism and deontology.
Firstly – contra deontology – virtue ethics looks at people, rather than mere actions. This sidesteps the problem of deontology mentioned above, where deontological people do not necessarily seem to be moral people. At the same time, since virtuous people act out their virtues, the resulting actions are also virtuous.
Secondly – contra consequentialism – virtue ethics’ instance on instinctive action rings more true with my intuitions on morality than a consequentialist cost-benefit analysis. For example, when meeting a beggar on the street, the virtuous person – acting in generosity, humility, moderation, or justice -- will take action to help them. A consequentialist will need to analyse whether any aid would increase the overall amount of good, and whether their, effort, money, food, etcetera might be better spent elsewhere where it would do more good.
Now a consequentialist might argue that a generous society does not necessarily imply a society effective at eliminating poverty, or similar evils which can be combatted with charity. A consequents society – they would say – is more effective at this because they analyse where, how, how much, and when to give. I would counter however that, the virtues cannot be taken in isolation. A generous person is not a virtuous person, though a virtuous person is generous. A virtuous person is furthermore wise, patient, and prudent, and will thus also act in a way which is maximally beneficial, even when these benefits do not show up on a cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, the virtuous sage may even employ consequents theories in their procurement of wisdom so that they can henceforth take the best courses of action.
A deontologist might argue that, while virtues make for good people, they do not make for good societies. A society where everyone follows their duties is a good society, but a society where everyone is virtuous might not be. I would retort however that virtuous people build virtuous societies, and that these societies run smoothly even in absence of duties. A virtuous society provides for its citizens even if there is no duty to “feed the hungry’’ or “clothe the cold’’. Virtuous people will built this society and work within it exactly because there is a unification of disposition, action, and outcome.
As I have now mentioned many times, I am a virtue ethicist. I (admittedly rather unoriginally) take wisdom, justice, courage, and prudence to be the core virtues, with all other virtues being derived from these.
I believe that the following of one’s duty and the analysis of outcomes are useful, especially when one is still cultivating virtue.
I belie that many religions stress the importance of these values, and believe that self-described adherents to these faiths too often ignore them. This is especially frustrating in faiths which I have personal affiliations with.
For example: The bible – to me – seems quite clear on the duty/virtue of generosity, inclusion, forgiveness, humility, and impartiality. And yet, I know few Christians who actually sold everything they didn’t need and gave it all to charity. Amongst the Christians I know, there are many judgemental types, who care more about who is sleeping with who, than about following Christ’s example and lifting the world out of suffering. They boast about their ‘virtue’, their ‘purity’, proud of how long they have been ‘saved’ about how often they go to church, how long and often they fast, whether they have been baptized, re-baptized, whether it was in a pool, a lake, in the Jordan itself. They make claims about what type of people can an cannot be Christians, about what behaviours are entirely incompatible with Jesus’ message all the while they adorn themselves with cowardice, excess, foolishness, and inequity; treating the Church as nothing but a cult of mutual benefit.
If you read this paragraph and think to yourself “yeah he is right, Christians are awful’’, then you have not understood anything. If you came away thinking you are exempt from this judgement because you are not Christian, know that the above applies to people I have met of all religious and non-religious persuasions.
If you have made it this far then I assume you are either infuriated by how wrong I am, or you agree with me at least in part. In either case, this seems a suitable place for a little “recruitment drive’’. If you agree with me that we must act with wisdom, courage, justice, and prudence, then I urge you to donate to a charitable cause or other high-impact virtuous program in any way which you are able. If you disagree with me on morality, then prove me wrong by donating in total absence of virtue. Perhaps because it increases overall utility, because it is your duty, because it makes you feel good and powerful to give to people you consider inferior. If you donate to a credible organisation, get a receipt and send it to me at <blog.wester.digital>, I will match the first 100 euros of donations to the causes of your choosing.
For inspiration consider: - Giving what we can - Give well - Giving Green